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THE ARGUMENT OF AN APPEAL*
John W. Davis
If a lecture on the well worn subject assigned to me is to be
given in this series, no one knows better than the Chairman of
your Committee on Post-Admission Legal Education that he and
not I should be the person to give it. This is true in the first place
because of the fact that in his lecture on Summary Judgment he
has given the perfect example of what these lectures ought to
be-informative, scholarly, helpful-and has set a standard
which it is unfair to ask others to rival. And in the second place
a discourse on the argument of an appeal would come with
superior force from a Judge who is in his judicial person the
target and the trier of the argument than from a random archer
like my self. Or, supposing fishes had the gift of speech, who
would listen to a fisherman's weary discourse on fly-casting, the
shape and color of the fly, the size of the tackle, the length of the
line, the merit of different rod makers and all the other tiresome
stuff that fishermen talk about, if the fish himself could be
induced to give his views on the most effective methods of
approach. For after all it is the fish that the angler is after and all
his recondite learning is but the hopeful means to that end.
I hope I may not be charged with levity or disrespect in
adopting this piscatorial figure. I do not suggest any analogies
between our reverent masters on the Bench and the finny tribe.
God forbid! Let such conceits tempt the less respectful. Yet it is
true, is it not, that in the argument of an appeal the advocate is
angling, consciously and deliberately angling, for the judicial
mind. Whatever tends to attract judicial favor to the advocate's
claim is useful. Whatever repels it is useless or worse. The
whole art of the advocate consists in choosing the one and
avoiding the other. Why otherwise have argument at all?
* Copyright 1940 The American Bar Association. Reprinted by permission of the ABA
Journal.
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I pause for definition. Argument, of course, may be written
as well as oral, and under our modem American practice written
argument has certainly become the most extended if not always
the weightier of the two. As our colleague, Joseph H. Choate, Jr.
recently remarked, "we have now reached the point where we
file our arguments in writing and deliver our briefs orally". Yet
it was not always so and in certain jurisdictions it is not so
today. In England, for instance, where many, perhaps most cases
are decided as soon as the argument is closed, counsel are not
expected to speak with one strabismic eye upon the clock and
the other on the court.
I recall that I once visited the chambers of the Privy
Council in London hoping to hear a Canadian friend argue a
Canadian appeal. When I arrived his adversary had the floor and
was laboriously reading to the Court from the open volumes,
page by page and line by line, the reported cases on which he
relied. Said I to the Clerk, "How long has he been speaking and
when will So-and-So come on?" "He has now been speaking",
said the Clerk, "for six consecutive days and I doubt if he
concludes today". I picked up my hat and sadly departed,
realizing into what an alien atmosphere I had wandered.
In the old days, when not only courts but lawyers and
litigants are reputed to have had more time at their disposal,
similar feats were performed at the American Bar. It has been
stated, for instance, that the arguments of Webster, Luther
Martin and their colleagues in McCulloch v. Maryland
consumed six days, while in the Girard will case Webster,
Horace Binney and others, for ten whole days assailed the
listening ears of the Court.
Those days have gone forever; and partly because of the
increased tempo of our times, partly because of the increase of
work in our appellate tribunals, the argument of an appeal,
whether by voice or pen, is hedged about today by strict
limitations of time and an increasing effort to provoke an
economy of space. The rules of nearly every court give notice
that there is a limit to what the judicial ear or the judicial eye is
prepared to absorb. Sometimes the judges plead, sometimes they
deplore, sometimes they command. The bar is continuously
besought to speak with an eye on the clock and to write with a
cramped pen.
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Observing this duty of condensation and selection I propose
tonight to direct my remarks primarily to the oral argument. I
begin after the briefs have all been filed; timely filed of course,
for in this matter lawyers are never, hardly ever, belated. I shall
assume that these briefs are models of brevity, are properly
indexed, and march with orderly logic from point to point; not
too little nor yet too much on any topic, even though in a painful
last moment of proofreading many an appealing paragraph has
been offered as a reluctant sacrifice on the altar of condensation.
I assume also that the briefs are not overlarded with long
quotations from the reported opinions, no matter how pat they
seem; nor over-crowded with citations designed it would seem
to certify to the industry of the brief-maker rather than to fortify
the argument. A horrible example of this latter fault crossed my
desk within the month in a brief which, in addition to many
statutes and text writers, cited by volume and page no less than
304 decided cases; a number calculated to discourage if not to
disgust the most industrious judge.
I assume further that they are not defaced by supras or
infras or by a multiplicity of footnotes which, save in the rare
case where they are needed to elucidate the text, do nothing but
distract the attention of the reader and interrupt the flow of
reasoning. And I remark in passing that these are no more
laudable in a judge's opinion than they are in a lawyer's brief.
I assume that there is not a pestilent "and/or" to be found
in the brief from cover to cover; or if there is, that the court,
jealous of our mother-tongue, will stamp upon the base intruder.
And finally I assume as of course that there has been no
cheap effort to use variety in type to supply the emphasis that
well constructed sentences should furnish for themselves. It may
be taken as axiomatic that even Judges, when they are so
disposed, can read understandingly; and I should think that
where the pages of a brief begin conversationally in small pica,
nudge the reader's elbow with repeated italics, rise to a higher
pitch with whole paragraphs of the text-not mere headings-in
black letter, and finally shout in full capitals (and such have
been observed), the Judge might well consider that what was a
well intentioned effort to attract his attention was in reality a
reflection on his intelligence.
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So it is with our briefs brought to this state of approximate
perfection that we approach our oral argument. Much has been
said pro and con as to the utility of this particular exercise. The
appellate court which I most frequently encountered in my early
days at the Bar made no secret of the fact that it regarded the
time spent in hearing cases as a sheer waste; and the
announcement "Submitted on briefs" always won an approving
nod from the bench. Fortunately, I think, that was an
idiosyncrasy which has passed away even in that tribunal. There
is much testimony, ancient and modem, for the contrary view.
Says Lord Coke, "No man alone with all his uttermost
labors, nor all the actors in them, themselves by themselves out
of a court of justice, can attain unto a right decision; nor in court
without solemn argument where I am persuaded Almighty God
openeth and enlargeth the understanding of those desirous of
justice and right". Agreeing as we must with this pious
sentiment, we lawyers sometimes think nevertheless that "God
moves in a mysterious way, his wonders to perform". Judge
Dillon in his lecture on the Laws and Jurisprudence of England
and America, declares that as a judge he felt reasonably assured
of his judgment where he had heard counsel and a very
diminished faith where the cause had not been orally argued, for
says he "Mistakes, errors, fallacies and flaws elude us in spite of
ourselves unless the case is pounded and hammered at the bar".
Chief Justice Hughes is on record to the effect that "The
desirability of a full exposition by oral argument in the highest
court is not to be gainsaid. It is a great saving of the time of the
court in the examination of extended records and briefs, to
obtain the grasp of the case that is made possible by oral
discussion and to be able more quickly to separate the wheat
from the chaff'. With all this most judges, I think, will agree,
always provided that the oral argument is inspired as it should
be with a single and sincere desire to be helpful to the court.
Professing no special fitness for the task, I have ventured
accordingly to frame a decalogue by which such arguments
should be governed. There is no mystical significance in the
number ten, although it has respectable precedent; and those
who think the number short and who wish to add to the roll
when I have finished, have my full permission to do so.
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At the head of the list I place, where it belongs, the cardinal
rule of all, namely:
(1) Change places, in your imagination of course,
with the Court.
Courts of appeal are not filled by Demigods. Some
members are learned, some less so. Some are keen and
perspicacious, some have more plodding minds. In short, they
are men and lawyers much like the rest of us. That they are
honest, impartial, ready and eager to reach a correct conclusion
must always be taken for granted. You may rightfully expect
and you do expect nothing but fair treatment at their hands. Yet
those who sit in solemn array before you, whatever their merit,
know nothing whatever of the controversy that brings you to
them, and are not stimulated to interest in it by any feeling of
friendship or dislike to anyone concerned. They are not moved
as perhaps an advocate may be by any hope of reward or fear of
punishment. They are simply being called upon for action in
their appointed sphere. They are anxiously waiting to be
supplied with what Mr. Justice Holmes called the "implements
of decision". These by your presence you profess yourself ready
to furnish. If the places were reversed and you sat where they
do, think what it is you would want first to know about the case.
How and in what order would you want the story told? How
would you want the skein unraveled? What would make easier
your approach to the true solution? These are questions the
advocate must unsparingly put to himself. This is what I mean
by changing places with the court.
If you happen to know the mental habits of any particular
judge, so much the better. To adapt yourself to his methods of
reasoning is not artful, it is simply elementary psychology; as is
also the maxim not to tire or irritate the mind you are seeking to
persuade. And may I say in passing that there is no surer way to
irritate the mind of any listener than to speak in so low a voice
or with such indistinct articulation or in so monotonous a tone as
to make the mere effort at hearing an unnecessary burden.
I proceed to Rule 2-
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(2) State first the nature of the case and briefly its prior history.
Every Appellate Court has passing before it a long
procession of cases that come from manifold and diverse fields
of the law and human experience. Why not tell the Court at the
outset to which of these fields its attention is about to be called?
If the case involves the construction of a will, the settlement of a
partnership, a constitutional question or whatever it may be, the
judge is able as soon as the general topic is mentioned to call to
his aid, consciously or unconsciously, his general knowledge
and experience with that particular subject. It brings what is to
follow into immediate focus. And then for the greater ease of the
court in listening it is well to give at once the history of the case
in so far as it bears on the court's jurisdiction. And sometimes
there may be, I am not sure, a certain curiosity to know just
whose judicial work it is that the court is called upon to review.
For judges, like other men, judge each other as well as the law.
Next in order(3) State the facts.
If I were disposed to violate the rule I have previously
announced against emphasis by typography, I would certainly
employ at this point the largest capital type. For it cannot be too
often emphasized that in an appellate court the statement of the
facts is not merely a part of the argument, it is more often than
not the argument itself. A case well stated is a case far more than
half argued. Yet how many advocates fail to realize that the
ignorance of the court concerning the facts in the case is
complete, even where their knowledge of the law may
adequately satisfy the proverbial presumption. The court wants
above all things to learn what are the facts which give rise to the
call upon its energies; for in many, probably in most cases, when
the facts are clear there is no great trouble about the law. Ex
facto oriturjus,and no court ever forgets it.
No more courteous judge ever sat on any bench than the
late Chief Justice White, but I shall never forget a remark which
he addressed to a distinguished lawyer, now dead, who was
presenting an appeal from an order of the Interstate Commerce
Commission. He had plunged headlong into a discussion of the
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powers of the Commission, and after he had talked for some
twenty-five minutes, the Chief Justice leaned over and said in
his blandest tone. "Now, Mr. So-and-So, won't you please tell
us what this case is about. We could follow you so much
better."
Of course there are statements and statements. No two men
probably would adopt an identical method of approach.
Uniformity is impossible, probably undesirable. Safe guides,
however, are to be found in the three C's---chronology, candor
and clarity: Chronology, because that is the natural way of
telling any story, stringing the events on the chain of time just as
all human life itself proceeds; candor, the telling of the worst as
well as the best, since the court has the right to expect it, and
since any lack of candor, real or apparent, will wholly destroy
the most careful argument; and clarity, because that is the
supreme virtue in any effort to communicate thought from man
to man. It admits of no substitute. There is a sentence of Daniel
Webster's which should be written on the walls of every law
school, court room and law office: "The power of clear
statement" said he "is the great power at the bar". Purple
passages can never supply its absence. And of course I must add
that no statement of the facts can be considered as complete
unless it has been so framed and delivered as to show forth the
essential merit, in justice and in right, of your client's cause.
(4) State next the applicable rules of law on which you rely.
If the statement of facts has been properly done the mind of
the court will already have sensed the legal questions at issue,
indeed they may have been hinted at as you proceed. These may
be so elementary and well established that a mere allusion to
them is sufficient. On the other hand, they may lie in the field of
divided opinion where it is necessary to expound them at greater
length and to dwell on the underlying reasons that support one
or the other view. It may be that in these days of what is
apparently waning health on the part of our old friend stare
decisis, one can rely less than heretofore upon the assertion that
the case at bar is governed by such-and-such a case, volume and
page. Even the shadow of a long succession of governing cases
may not be adequate shelter. In any event the advocate must be
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prepared to meet any challenge to the doctrine of the cases on
which he relies and to support it by original reasoning. Barren
citation is a broken reed. What virtue it retains can be left for the
brief.
(5) Always "go for the jugularvein".
I do not know from what source I quote that phrase but it is
of course familiar. Rufus Choate's expression was "the hub of
the case". More often than not there is in every case a cardinal
point around which lesser points revolve like planets around the
sun, or even as dead moons around a planet; a central fortress
which if strongly held will make the loss of all the outworks
immaterial. The temptation is always present to "let no guilty
point escape" in the hope that if one book breaks another may
hold. Yielding to this temptation is pardonable perhaps in a
brief, of which the court may read as much or as little as it
chooses. There minor points can be inserted to form "a moat
defensive to a house". But there is no time and rarely any
occasion in oral argument for such diversions.
I think in this connection of one of the greatest lawyers, and
probably the greatest case winner of our day, the late John G.
Johnson of Philadelphia. He was a man of commanding physical
presence and of an intellect equally robust. Before appellate
courts he addressed himself customarily to but a single point,
often speaking for not more than twenty minutes but with
compelling force. When he had concluded it was difficult for his
adversary to persuade the court that there was anything else
worthy to be considered. This is the quintessence of the
advocate's art.
(6) Rejoice when the court asks questions.
And again I say unto you, rejoice! If the question does
nothing more it gives you assurance that the court is not
comatose and that you have awakened at least a vestigial
interest. Moreover a question affords you your only chance to
penetrate the mind of the court, unless you are an expert in face
reading, and to dispel a doubt as soon as it arises. This you
should be able to do if you know your case and have a sound
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position. If the question warrants a negative answer, do not
fence with it but respond with a bold thwertutnay-which for
the benefit of the illiterate I may explain as a term used in
ancient pleading to signify a downright No. While if the answer
is in the affirmative or calls for a concession the court will be
equally gratified to have the matter promptly disposed of. If you
value your argumentative life do not evade or shuffle or
postpone, no matter how embarrassing the question may be or
how much it interrupts the thread of your argument. Nothing I
should think would be more irritating to an inquiring court than
to have refuge taken in the familiar evasion "I am coming to
that" and then to have the argument end with the promise
unfulfilled. If you are really coming to it indicate what your
answer will be when it is reached and never, never sit down until
it is made.
Do not get into your head the idea that there is a deliberate design on the part of any judge to embarrass counsel by
questions. His mind is seeking help, that is all, although it may
well be that he calls for help before he really needs it. You
remember Bacon's admonition on the subject in his Essay on
Judicature:
"It is no grace to a judge" he says, "first to find that which
he might have heard in due time from the bar, or to show
quickness of conceit in cutting off evidence or counsel too
short, or to prevent information by questions though
pertinent."
On the other hand, Chief Justice Denison of the Supreme
Court of Colorado puts the matter thus:
"A perfect argument would need no interruption and a
perfect Judge would never interrupt it; but we are not
perfect. If the argument.., discusses the truth of the first
chapter of Genesis when the controlling issue is the
constitutionality of a Tennessee statute it ought to be
interrupted.... It is the function of the Court to decide the
case and to decide it properly .... The Judge knows where
his doubts lie, at which point he wishes to be enlightened; it
is he whose mind at last must be made up, no one can do it
for him, and he must take his own course of thought to
accomplish it. Then he must sometimes interrupt."
Judges are sometimes more annoyed by each other's
questions than counsel, I have observed. I remember a former
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Justice of the Supreme Court much given to interrogation, who

engaged counsel in a long colloquy of question and answer at
the very threshold of his argument. In a stage whisper audible
within the bar Chief Justice White was heard to moan "I want to
hear the argument". "So do I, damn him" growled his neighbor,
Justice Holmes. Yet questions fairly put and frankly answered
give to oral argument a vitality and spice that nothing else will
supply.
(7) Read sparingly and only from necessity.
The eye is the window of the mind, and the speaker does
not live who can long hold the attention of any audience without
looking it in the face. There is something about a sheet of paper
interposed between speaker and listener that walls off the mind
of the latter as if it were boiler-plate. It obstructs the passage of
thought as the lead plate bars the X-rays. I realize that I am
taking just this risk at present, but this is not a speech or an
argument, only, God save the mark, a lecture.
Of course where the case turns upon the language of a
statute or the terms of a written instrument it is necessary that it
should be read, always, if possible, with a copy in the hands of
the court so that the eye of the court may supplement its ear. But
the reading of lengthy extracts from reported cases or long
excerpts from the testimony can only be described as a sheer
waste of time. With this every appellate court of my
acquaintance agrees. A sentence here or a sentence there,
perhaps, if sufficiently pertinent and pithy, but not, I beg of you,
print by the paragraph or page.
There is a cognate fault of which most of us from time to
time are guilty. This arises when we are seeking to cite or
distinguish other cases bearing on our claims and are tempted
into a tedious recital of the facts in the cited case, not
uncommonly prefaced by the somewhat awkward phrase "That
was a case where", etc. Now the human mind is a pawky thing
and must be held to its work and it is little wonder after three or
four or half a dozen such recitals that not only are the recited
facts forgotten but those in the case at bar become blurred and
confused. What the advocate needs most of all is that his facts
and his alone should stand out stark, simple, unique, clear.

THE ARGUMENT OF AN APPEAL

(8) Avoid personalities.
This is a hard saying, especially when one's feelings are
ruffled by a lower court or by opposing counsel,, but none the
less it is worthy of all acceptation, both in oral argument and in
brief. I am not speaking merely of the laws of courtesy that must
always govern an honorable profession, but rather of the sheer
inutility of personalities as a method of argument in a judicial
forum. Nor am I excluding proper comment on things that
deserve reprobation. I am thinking psychologically again. It is
all a question of keeping the mind of the court on the issues in
hand without distraction from without.
One who criticizes unfairly or harshly the action of a lower
court runs the risk of offending the quite understandable esprit
de corps of the judicial body. Rhetorical denunciation of
opposing litigants or witnesses may arouse a measure of
sympathy for the persons so denounced. While controversies
between counsel impose on the court the wholly unnecessary
burden and annoyance of preserving order and maintaining the
decorum of its proceedings. Such things can irritate; they can
never persuade.
(9) Know your recordfrom cover to cover.
This commandment might properly have headed the list for
it is the sine qua non of all effective argument. You have now
reached a point in the litigation where you can no longer hope to
supply the want of preparation by lucky accidents or mental
agility. You will encounter no more unexpected surprises. You
have your last chance to win for your client. It is clear therefore
that the field tactics of the trial table will no longer serve and the
time has come for major strategy based upon an accurate
knowledge of all that has occurred. At any moment you may be
called on to correct some misstatement of your adversary and at
any moment you may confront a question from the court which,
if you are able to answer by an apt reference to the record or
with a firm reliance on a well-furnished memory, will increase
the confidence with which the court will listen to what else you
may have to say. Many an argument otherwise admirable has
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been destroyed because of counsel's inability to make just such
a response.
(10) Sit down.
This is the tenth and last commandment. In preparing for
argument you will no doubt have made an outline carefully
measured by the time at your command. The notes of it which
you should have jotted down lie before you on the reading desk.
When you have run through this outline and are satisfied that the
court has fully grasped your contentions, what else is there left
for you to do? You must be vain indeed to hope that by further
speaking you can dragoon the court into a prompt decision in
your favor. The mere fact that you have an allotted time of one
hour more or less does not constitute a contract with the court to
listen for that length of time. On the contrary, when you round
out your argument and sit down before your time has expired, a
benevolent smile overspreads the faces on the bench and a sigh
of relief and gratification arises from your brethren at the bar
who have been impatiently waiting for the moment when the
angel might again trouble the waters of the healing pool and
permit them to step in. Earn these exhibitions of gratitude
therefore whenever you decently can, and leave the rest to Zeus
and his colleagues, that is to say, to the judges on high Olympus.
Before I obey this admonition myself, may I say, Mr.
Chairman, how painfully conscious I am that I have offered
nothing new concerning the subject in hand. I have not even
been able to cover old thoughts with new varnish. How could I
have hoped to do so? The process of appeal from one tribunal to
another is very old in the history of human justice. No matter in
what form it is carried on the essentials of an appeal are always
the same, and there is nothing very new to be said about it. The
need for an appellate process arises from the innate realization
of mankind that the human intellect and human justice are frail
at their best. It is necessary therefore to measure one man's mind
against another in order to purge the final result, so far as may
be, of all passion, prejudice or infirmity. It is the effort to realize
the maximum of justice in human relations; and to keep firm and
stable the foundations on which all ordered society rests. There
is no field of nobler usefulness for the lawyer. For him, who in
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the splendid words of Chancellor D'Aguesseau, belongs to an
order "as old as the magistracy, as noble as virtue, as necessary
as justice".

